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The German government plans to introduce a kilometre charge on motorways for heavy duty vehicles >12t, beginning in the year 2003. Ac-
cording to an EU Directive the charge has to be orientated to the average infrastructure costs and can be differentiated according to the environmen-
tal performance (“EURO Standard”) of the vehicles. Based on the possible differentiation of the user charge this paper analyses the probable impacts
on the transport market and on basic environmental indicators. Three scenarios are constructed: first, a modest user charge only on motorways;
second, a higher user charge on the whole network of federal roads with a given level of service of the railways; and third, the previous scenario
combined with an improved level of service of the railways. The result is that only in the case of the third scenario the hope of environmental policy is
realistic that road transport can be reduced and environmental quality significantly improved through a road user charging scheme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The German Federal Government plans to introduce
a user charge for heavy-duty vehicles on German
motorways beginning in the year 2003. This will include
all road freight vehicles and buses exceeding a tonnage
of 12 tons. The first objective is to improve the use of
capacity, which includes the use of infrastructure (of the
different transport modes), the loading of vehicles and the
optimisation of logistic patterns. The second objective is
to allocate the total cost of the infrastructure in a fair way
to the users and to avoid distortions of competition
through a balanced cost allocation or subsidisation. Third,
the pricing scheme should provide incentives to use the
best environmental technology and to reduce the environ-
mental costs of freight transport.
The European Commission published a White Pa-
per in 1998 in which the pricing scheme of social mar-
ginal cost pricing was strongly recommended to the
member countries to achieve the objectives mentioned1.
However, these suggestions have been subject to some
criticism by member countries, in particular, because the
assumptions for deriving this so-called “first-best”– so-
lution of welfare theory are very rigid and far from the
real world2. Before the background of the criticism of the
concept of social marginal cost pricing the European Par-
liament has modified a Directive of the European Com-
mission for the road user charging of heavy-duty vehicles
in a way that prices should be in principle based on fully
distributed costs, but can be modified according to the
time of day in congested network parts and to environ-
mental characteristics of the vehicles.
The principles of price setting according to this Eu-
ropean Directive look very simple, as they include three
issues:
(1) The full infrastructure cost should be allocated to
the users;
(2) Prices on highly congested network sections can be
higher than on low congested parts; and
(3) Prices for environmentally cleaner vehicles can be
lower than for old technology vehicles.* Paper submitted to the 81st Annual Meeting of the Transportation Re-
search Board (TRB) Washington DC, 13th–17th January 2002.
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However, the reactions of the demand side can be
manifold such that the design of an optimal charging sys-
tem for heavy-duty vehicles on the motorways subject to
the three issues results in a complex optimisation calcula-
tion.
In this paper we will give very brief theoretical
treatment of fair and efficient pricing in the transport sec-
tor. The legal requirements of European Directives con-
strain the possible pricing schemes and we will focus in
this paper on the remaining possibilities to stimulate ef-
ficient behaviour and environmental protection. Empha-
sis is paid to analyse the possible reactions of the demand
side to the pricing schemes and the development of mod-
elling approaches for simulating such reactions in a quan-
titative way. Finally three scenarios for heavy-duty
vehicles pricing schemes on German motorways are pre-
sented and their possible impacts on road freight traffic
in Germany are discussed. This leads to particular con-
clusions with respect to the environmentally motivated
differentiation of user charges and to the appropriate de-
sign of a road-pricing scheme.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF
EFFICIENT AND FAIR PRICING
The European Commission proposed to introduce
a scheme as a social marginal cost pricing in the Euro-
pean transport sector. “Marginal costs are those variable
costs that reflect the cost of an additional vehicle or trans-
port unit using the infrastructure. Strictly speaking they
can vary every minute, with different transport users, at
different times, in different conditions and in different
places”1. With this definition, the Commission has deter-
minedly committed itself to the short run marginal costs,
which means that all cost components that do not react
to minor changes of usage are excluded from the calcu-
lation. In particular all fixed costs of the infrastructure
or of the administration are eliminated by this way. So-
cial marginal costs only comprise operating cost, cost of
wear and tear of the infrastructure, congestion and scar-
city cost, ecological cost and accident costs, caused by
additional transport unit using the infrastructure.
It is well known from the theory of welfare econom-
ics that social marginal cost pricing is efficient under cer-
tain conditions in the sense that it leads to an optimum
capacity utilisation of given infrastructure network. This
old insight, which dates back to Pigou3 and has been pe-
riodically revived for academic purposes, is linked to a
number of very rigid basic premises. Therefore several
branches of pricing theory have been developed to gen-
erate pricing schemes which provide economic efficiency
subject to constraints of the real world. Examples are the
Ramsey pricing or the multi-part tariff rules.
While the above mentioned pricing schemes are ori-
entated to efficiency (maximising welfare subject to con-
straints) the fully distributed cost (FDC) schemes also
include fairness issues. People often regard a pricing sys-
tem to be fair if the price reflects the full costs, which
have been caused by a user. But there is still a deeper
rationale for FDC schemes. Assume that the transport in-
frastructure belongs to a club of users and that the state
only plays the role of an arbiter. As the club does not exist
for one period only, and the demand of the club mem-
bers for infrastructure capacity and quality develops over
time, it is obvious that the cost of capacity has to be in-
cluded in the pricing scheme. An allocation scheme ac-
cording to the club principle then has to meet some
efficiency and fairness principles4.
Efficiency issues are:
(1) The infrastructure club management (state admin-
istration or state-regulated company) should receive
incentives to build the optimal size of the infrastruc-
ture; it should just break even.
(2) There should be no cross subsidisation in the sense
that a user group pays more than the costs would
be to accommodate this group alone.
(3) All infrastructure users should receive enough in-
centives to use the capacity economically.
These issues are paired with fairness requirements:
(4) Smaller (lighter) vehicles pay less than larger (heav-
ier) vehicles.
(5) The amount by which the charge to a larger (heavier)
vehicle exceeds that for a smaller one does not ex-
ceed the difference in cost of providing capacity for
the two types.
Contrasting the information given in the textbook
literature FDC schemes can be highly differentiated. The
cost allocation scheme can show a very detailed struc-
ture and link cost blocks to the appropriate lever points
of decision making of user groups (members of the club).
In the German motorway cost allocation study
which is presently undertaken to derive cost figures as a
basis for setting user charges the cost allocation proce-
dure comprises three levels:
Allocation of the cost of deterioration of the infrastruc-
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ture according to the causality principle (e.g., applying
the modified AASHO-road tests).
Allocation of parts of the construction costs according
to the “investments specificity principle”. This means
that particular user groups have specific investment re-
quirements, such for instance heavy duty vehicles need
a greater thickness of layers or a higher stability of
bridge construction while cars need a motorway design
with low curvature and more consumption of space be-
cause of the high speed. These cost differentials can be
allocated in a structured way.
Allocation of the remaining common costs according
to fairness principles of Game Theory. The first allo-
cation principle set above corresponds with the mar-
ginal cost issue. The second allocation principle is
motivated by the fact that every item of the road con-
struction has to be replaced in the future and that the
user groups which express demand for this particular
item should pay a fair amount into the cash of the club
of users such that the replacement of this construction
item can be financed. After applying these two prin-
ciples there will still remain some common costs which
have to be allocated to the users as they have to be paid
by the whole club. Game Theory has developed inter-
esting solutions to this problem such that this final step
of cost allocation does not have to be performed by an
arbitrary rule of thumb but can be based on clear axi-
oms of fairness (e.g., Shapley-value; Nucleolus alloca-
tion; Disruption Nucleolus allocation*).
3. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF A
PRICING SCHEME FOR HDV ON EUROPEAN
MOTORWAYS
The principles of price setting according to Euro-
pean Directive 1999/62/EG from June 17th 1999 are
threefold:
(1) The average cost of the transport infrastructure,
which can be allocated to a user group, is the bench-
mark for the user charge. This means that the over-
all revenues from user charging should exactly
equal the cost of infrastructure provision and op-
eration. Further costs (external costs) of transport
should not be internalised through the infrastructure
user charge**.
(2) It is possible to differentiate the user charges by
time of the day (peak hours – off peak hours). The
difference between the lowest and the highest
charge should not exceed 100%. The differentiation
of the charges has to be conforming to the under-
lying objective, which is a more balanced use of the
infrastructure capacity over the time of the day.
(3) The user charges can be differentiated according to
vehicle emission categories. The emission catego-
ries which are presently relevant are Euro 0, Euro
1, Euro 2, Euro 3 (presently obligatory for newly
licensed vehicles), Euro 4 (obligatory beginning in
the year 2006) and Euro 5 (obligatory beginning in
the year 2008). Note that Euro 4 technology is al-
ready available and that Euro 5 technology will be
available in the medium term. The Directive fixes
the ranges between the lowest and the highest
charge according to the environmental differentia-
tion to maximally 50%.
The rules stated by the Directive 1999/62/EG state,
furthermore, that these charging principles apply to
motorways and roads of similar construction type only.
Further roads can be included as soon as they are highly
affected through motorway charging (diversion of traf-
fic from motorways to secondary roads) such that the se-
curity level of these roads is negatively affected. Finally
the Directive excludes a double pricing of the road us-
ers, for instance it does not allow for combining a time
dependent charge (Vignette system) with a kilometre de-
pendent charge (a user charge according to the Directive).
This means that the motorway vignette which is presently
existing for heavy duty vehicles in Germany and some
other European countries has to be abandoned as soon as
the kilometre charge is introduced.
Contrasting the clear devices which the Directive
is giving with many respects it leaves the problem of defi-
nition and valuation of infrastructure cost completely
open. What concerns the definition of infrastructure cost
it is unclear to which extent the overhead costs of public
administration can be included and whether compensa-
tory measures for environmental protection can be con-
sidered or not. When it comes to the valuation of
infrastructure cost a variety of different methodologies are
possible from the scientific point of view. In a current
** The member countries are free to internalize external cost of transport
through fuel taxes or ecological taxes or regulations within the ranges
of the European directives.
* See Rothengatter, 2001: Flexible cost estimation for transport infra-
structure provision as a base for user charging schemes (including a
game theoretical appendix). Paper presented to the WCTR in Seoul.
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motorway cost allocation study, for instance, the consult-
ing institutes to the Ministry of Transport, Prognos (Swit-
zerland) and IWW (Germany) have discussed three
possible departures for the valuation of infrastructure
costs:
1) Public administration approach;
2) Public enterprise approach; and
3) Private enterprise approach.
Very roughly speaking and not anticipating the fi-
nal results of this study the range between the lowest and
the highest evaluation could be between 0.125  and
0.25  per truck kilometre (>12t). This means that the lack
of guidelines for defining and valuing infrastructure costs
leads to a wide range of possible cost values.
4. POSSIBLE REACTIONS OF THE DEMAND
SIDE AND MODELLING APPROACHES FOR
THEIR SIMULATION
The kilometre based user charges will be introduced
in Germany in the year 2003 for all road freight vehicles
between 12 and 40 tons. The government has already de-
cided that there should be a differentiation of the charges
according to the environmental performance of the ve-
hicles but not according to the time of the day (or the level
of congestion). On the base of the a priori settings by the
European Directive and the decision of the German gov-
ernment, the German Environmental Agency has
launched a study on the possible differentiation of the user
charges and their impacts on the transport market and on
the environment as well5. The following results refer to
this study. Four types of reactions have been analysed:
Diversion of traffic from the motorways to the second-
ary network;
Diversion from road to rail;
Strategic adjustments of logistics, roundtrips and load-
ing factors in the road haulage industry; and
Change of the vehicle fleet.
It is evident that the simulation of the reactions of
the demand side requires to apply a series of models
which describe the particular behaviour of hauliers and
shippers in the segments mentioned. It would be inappro-
priate to estimate the demand reactions by using average
elasticities as this is often done to roughly calculate the
reactions of demand.
Altogether five different models have been applied
to study the different impacts:
1. Road haulage cost model
The cost structure for German trucking operations has
been taken from the records of the road haulage as-
sociation. Relating this cost to the units of weight and
distance (ton kilometres) one results in six major in-
fluencing effects for the cost per ton kilometre: trans-
port distance, transport time, vehicle type, vehicle
loading, product category and parcel size. The influ-
ence on these factors varies in the three transport seg-
ments: regional transport, domestic transport and
international transport. On the base of this differenti-
ated model for the cost of hauliers it was possible to
derive the relative impact of a road user charge on the
road haulage costs in the different market segments.
2. Social cost model
As the impacts of road user charging schemes are
partly welfare enhancing but also partly reducing wel-
fare it was necessary to construct an indicator for the
social valuation of different pricing schemes. This has
been done on the basis of a social cost evaluation of
road freight transport activities6.
3. Freight transport network model
IWW has developed a European transport model in-
cluding the road and rail networks7. Freight transport
matrices have been generated in other projects for the
European Commission and the network models have
been finally categorised on the basis of traffic counts.
Therefore the model estimations meet the actual ob-
servations with sufficient accuracy. This network
model could be used to simulate traffic diversion from
motorways to secondary networks in case of introduc-
ing a user charge on motorways and the shift of free
traffic from road to rail (change of modal split).
4. Logistic model
The main reaction to road user charging is not the di-
version from road to rail rather than internal adjust-
ment of road freight traffic. This consists in changing
the vehicle roundtrips, changing the loading of ve-
hicles and changing the logistic structure. The logis-
tic model EUNET, developed by IWW, has been
applied to simulate the possible change of logistics.
5. Vehicle fleet model
As soon as road user charges are differentiated with
respect to the environmental performance of road ve-
hicles, incentives will arise to purchase new and en-
vironmentally better technology. This leads to change
in the structure of the vehicle fleet. IWW has devel-
oped a system dynamics model for the assessment of
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the OECD scenario EST (Environmentally Sustain-
able Transport)8. One module of this system dynam-
ics model is a cohort model for the trucking fleet in
Germany. This model has been made sensitive to en-
vironmental charging using the cost information of the
road haulage cost model (see model 1). This means
that it has been assumed that the road haulage indus-
try changes to new technology as soon as net cost sav-
ings can be expected. As there is presently and in the
next years a large market for used trucks in Central
and Eastern Europe one can follow that the reaction
to a high differentiation of user charges according to
environmental parameters is relatively high, because
the industry can most probably sell the used vehicle
stocks.
5. SCENARIOS TO STUDY THE IMPACTS OF
DIFFERENT PRICING SCHEMES ON THE
ENVIRONMENT
Three scenarios have been constructed to study the
impacts of motorway user charging for heavy duty ve-
hicles. The basic characters of these scenarios are sum-
marized in Table 1.
For scenario I it is assumed that only the motorways
are priced while the secondary network is free of charge.
The average user charge is 0.125  for the years 2003-
2010 in a constant value. For the different weight classes
between 12t and 40t a differentiation is assumed in so far
as trucks with a weight higher than 18t pay 0.025  more
than average while the remaining trucks pay less.
In scenario II it is assumed that the road pricing is
applied to motorways and primaries. The average user
charge starts with 0.125  in the year 2003 and is increased
in constant steps such that it reaches 0.2  in 2010. The
weight related additional charge starts with 0.025  in
2003 for the heavy loads with a higher weight than 18t
and ends with 0.05  in 2010.
For a more detailed analysis of the possibilities of
diverting freight traffic to the railways, it has been assumed
in scenario IIa that the level of service of railways is kept
constant over the time range considered, while in scenario
IIb it has been assumed that the level of service of the
railways will be considerably improved in the future. The
background of this assumption is that the government
plans to spend a part of the revenues from road user
charging for investing in better railway networks.
A remark should be added with respect to the av-
erage cost value of 0.125  per truck km. The Ministry of
Transport, Housing and Construction has in 1999 estab-
lished a high level Commission to study the possibilities
for the future financing of the transport infrastructure (the
so-called Pällmann Commission)*. The main outcome of
the Commission’s work was the suggestion to the Min-
istry to change the finance of transport infrastructure from
tax finance to finance by user charging. The Commission
suggested furthermore to establish companies of private
law, owned by the state, for the Federal roads, the Fed-
eral railways and the Federal inland waterways. These
companies should be responsible for designing, planning,
building, financing and operating the infrastructure net-
works. For the German motorways the Commission has
calculated that the price of 0.3DM (this equals roughly
0.15 ) would be appropriate to collect enough revenues
to finance the cost of motorways which are allocated to
heavy duty vehicles. According to the Commission the
trucks are contributing already 0.05DM (0.025 ) to the
motorway finance through the fuel tax, their final sug-
gestion was to introduce a motorway charge for heavy
duty vehicles of 0.25DM (0.125 ).
As a differentiation of the user charges according
to the environmental performance is considered it is im-
portant to list the existing Euro standards, the time of in-
troduction and the limit values for different types of
exhaust emissions. This is shown in Table 2.
Figure 1 gives the shares of the different Euro stan-
dards in the vehicle stock from 2003-2010 according to
a reference scenario (development without incentive ef-
fects of user charging).
The dynamics of this structure change of the vehicle
fleet has been forecasted by using the fleet cohort model
of IWW. While in 2003 there are trucks of all emission
standards on German roads this reduces to three standards
   Table 1  Basic definition of scenarios
Priced User Charge Weight Related
Network Average > 12t Add. Charge > 18t
Scenario I Motorways 0.125 0.025(2003–2010) (2003–2010)
Scenario II Motorways 0.125  (2003) 0.025  (2003)
and Primaries 0.2  (2010) 0.05  (2010)
Scenario IIa Constant level of service for railways
Scenario IIb Improved level of service for railways
* This name refers to the Chairman of the Commission, Wilhelm Pällmann,
former Chairman of the Deutsche Telecom and former member of
Managing Board of the Deutsche Bahn.
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only in 2010 (Euro 3, Euro 4, Euro 5). Evaluating this
result one has to consider that presently no further Euro
standards (Euro 6, 7, etc.) are known and there is also
no information available on their possible introduction
time. The figure shows furthermore that the speed of
structure change is higher for the heavy load categories,
or, in other words, their average life time is lower.
Remembering the regulation of the European
Directive 1999/62/EC, which allows for a maximum dif-
ferentiation of tariffs of 50% between the best and the
worst environmental category one results in the correc-
tion factors of Table 3. As can be seen from this table
the degree of differentiation is diminishing in the time
from 2003 to 2010.
On the basis of these preliminary considerations one
can derive that the patterns of the user charges for road
freight vehicles for the different scenarios and the years
2003 and 2010. The magnitude of the user charges are
exhibited in Table 4. The cost values have been derived
after repeatedly employing models 1– 5 which were in-
troduced in the previous chapter. The complexity of this
modeling is caused by the fact that by definition a full
cost recovery has to be guaranteed. The share of total in-
frastructure cost which is allocated to heavy duty vehicles
is dependent on the number of such vehicles and their
axle loads. The number of vehicles, the axle loads and
the kilometres traveled are dependent on the user charge
and the various reactions of shippers and hauliers to dif-
ferent magnitudes of user charges. The summary of the
impact analyses, which is given in the following, gives
some insight to the complexity of this interactive model-
ing scheme.
It can be seen from Table 4 that in the year 2003,
when the charges will be introduced, there is little dif-
ferentiation between the standards Euro 3, 4 and 5, while
the differentiation between Euro 0, 1 and 2 is compara-
tively high. This structure completely changes up to the
year 2010. There will be only a very small share of ve-
hicles with Euro 0, 1 and 2 standards such that a differ-
entiation between these standards does not make sense
any more. Now the categorization into Euro 3, 4 and 5
has matters which result in a considerable range of the
Table 2 Time of introduction and emission limit values
for the single Euro standards (in g/kWh)
Norm Euro 0 Euro 1 Euro 2 Euro 3 Euro 4 Euro 5
Introduction 1990 1993 1996 2001 2006 2008
HC 2.60 1.23 1.10 0.66 0.46 0.46
CO 12.30 4.90 4.00 2.10 1.50 1.50
NOx 15.80 9.00 7.00 5.00 3.50 2.00
Particulate
— 0.40 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.02Matter
Fig.1  Fleet structure according to emission categories in Germany from 2003-2010
Euro 0 (Pre-Euro) Euro 1 Euro 2 Euro 3 Euro 4 Euro 5 
Share of Total
Truck km Lkw 3.5t – 12t Lkw 12t – 18t Lkw > 18t
HDV-Shares of Emission Categories 2003–2010
(Reference Scenario)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2003 2010 2003 2010 2003 2010
Table 3 Correction factors according to emission
categories (%)
Emission NOx Limit Value Relevance Factor (%)
Category (g/kWh) 2003 2010 2003 2010
Euro 0 16.8 x 50.0 % 50.0 %
Euro 1 9.0 x 22.4 % 50.0 %
Euro 2 7.0 x x 14.2 % 50.0 %
Euro 3 5.0 x x   6.1 % 30.0 %
Euro 4 3.5 x x   0.0 % 15.0 %
Euro 5 2.0 x   0.0 %   0.0 %
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user charges. It can also be seen that all the constraints
which have been set a priori (average values, weight re-
lated add-ups, maximum spread between the environmen-
tally best and worst categories) are met.
6. TRAFFIC DIVERSION TO THE SECONDARY
NETWORK
The introduction of user charges on the motorways
can have two impacts on route choice. Firstly the users
might partly or completely divert from the motorways to
the secondary networks which are not priced. Secondly
– in particular if also the secondary networks are subject
to road pricing – users might prefer shorter routes i.e.,
they prefer to reduce transport distance rather than trans-
port time. Distance/time trade off. This effect has been
qualified in two steps:
In a first step for every HDV-category a prototype
vehicle has been defined – using the information on cost
and load characteristics – and routed optimally from each
origin to each destination under the scenario conditions.
The route search is done for an uncongested network such
that this computation generates the maximum potential
of users, who might consider changing the route, because
this could bring a net cost saving.
In a second step the network is loaded with traffic
through the transport model VACLAV and the propen-
sity to divert is checked again under the condition of re-
alistic congestion in the secondary network (in particular
in urban areas). As many benefits from route diversion
are eaten up by congestion the second step gives a more
realistic picture on the actual behaviour of users.
It is often argued that users prefer to stay on a
motorway because in this case they need less informa-
tion on the right route and feel more certain. But in par-
ticular for heavy duty vehicles this cannot be expected
in the future as most of the vehicles will be equipped with
digital travel assistance.
Table 5 gives the result of the calculation. The typi-
cal results are:
The magnitude of freight traffic diversion to second-
ary networks is decreasing with increasing distance.
The magnitude of diversion is decreasing with increas-
ing Euro Standard.
The magnitude of diversion is decreasing with increas-
ing weight.
If the whole Federal road network is priced the diver-
sion effects are substantially lower compared to pric-
ing the motorways only.
7. FREIGHT TRAFFIC DIVERSION FROM
ROAD TO RAIL
Applying the transport model and enriching this
model with detailed expertise from European and Swiss
scenarios (projects PETS, SOFTICE, Transalpine Transport
studies), it was possible to derive a differentiated picture
for the possibilities of modal shift of freight transport. Fig-
ure 2 gives the aggregate result in terms of the compari-
son between the scenarios and the reference case. It can be
seen that in the scenario I case of modest pricing of the
motorways, only, the resulting effects on modal shift are
very low, better to say negligible. In scenario IIa it is as-
sumed that the road user charges are higher and apply to
the whole Federal road network. In this case one can de-
rive a significant shift from road to rail which is, however,
modest in magnitude. Only 4% of domestic traffic and
about 7% of international traffic can be shifted from road
to rail under these conditions. Only if there is a substan-
tial upgrading of the level of service of railways in Ger-
many, which is assumed in scenario IIb, can one expect
Table 4 User charges in the scenarios I and II for the
years 2003 and 2010
Categories (Euro/Truck km) 2003 (Euro/Truck km) 2010
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario I Scenario II
Motorways All Federal Motorways All Federal
Roads Roads
HDV 12t - 18t
  Euro 0 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.19
  Euro 1 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.19
  Euro 2 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.19
  Euro 3 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.17
  Euro 4 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.15
  Euro 5 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13
HDV >18t + Art. HDV
  Euro 0 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.27
  Euro 1 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.27
  Euro 2 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.27
  Euro 3 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.24
  Euro 4 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.20
  Euro 5 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.18
Average
  All weight 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18
  classes
  HDV 12t – 18t 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14
  HDV >18t + 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.19
  Art. HDV
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a shift from road to rail, which comes closer to the po-
litical expectations. The gain in transport performance of
the railways is between 12% and 35% in the market seg-
ments of domestic and international transport. As ex-
pected there is little effect in regional and local freight
transport.
8. INTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS AND
IMPROVEMENT OF LOADING FACTORS
While environmental policy usually expects that the
major reaction of pricing road transport is a shift from
the road to environmentally more friendly modes, in re-
ality the main reaction is an internal adjustment within
the road freight transport sector. However, it is very hard
to model the manifold reactions of hauliers and shippers
to reduce the companies’ transport cost and by this to
partly compensate for the user charges.
There are different forms of rationalization of trans-
port operations and the adjustment of the vehicle fleet.
This includes for instance the optimization of round trip
tours, the formation of vehicle pools or the co-operation
between transport haulage firms. An adjustment of the
vehicle fleet can consist in using a higher share of ve-
hicles with a weight less than 12t which are not priced
or the use of very heavy vehicles to improve on the load-
ing efficiency of the vehicles. Besides such standard
forms of adjustments one can also observe cost saving
activities which are beyond legal forms of competition
but not severely penalized in Europe. This concerns the
employment of drivers from east and south-east European
countries, the overloading of vehicles, the violation of
regulations and social dumping practices. It can be ex-
pected that a higher cost pressure through road user
charges has also an impact on illegal practice. This does
not necessarily mean that road user charging tends to in-
crease the illegal operations in the haulage market. There
are also clear indications that employment of low cost
drivers or cabotage practice of firms located in low wage
and environmentally less regulated countries is reduced.
This is due to the fact that cabotage and dumping freight
traffic activities imply to go longer distances on the road
Table 5  Route diversions in scenarios I and II
Scenario Vehicle Type Regional Transport Long Distance Total Long
 
(< 150km) 150 to 300km 300 to 500km > 500km Distance
I Articulated HDV, Euro 0 7.8% 6.1% 3.7% 2.1% 3.9%
0.125 Articulated HDV, Euro 5 5.2% 4.1% 2.6% 1.3% 2.6%
on HDV, Euro 0 8.4% 6.5% 3.4% 2.4% 4.0%
Motorways HDV, Euro 5 5.2% 4.2% 2.1% 1.4% 2.5%
II Articulated HDV, Euro 0 5.2% 4.1% 2.3% 1.2% 2.4%
0.175 Articulated HDV, Euro 5 3.3% 2.3% 1.6% 0.8% 1.5%
on HDV, Euro 0 6.5% 4.8% 2.6% 1.7% 3.0%
Motorways HDV, Euro 5 4.1% 3.0% 1.3% 0.8% 1.7%
Growth in Rail Freight Transport Volume 2010
Scenario I Scenario IIa Scenario IIb
FG = Forwarder goods, BG = Bulk goods, RT = Regional traffic (<150 km), DLT =  Domestic long-distance traffic, BLT = Border-crossing long-
distance traffic, SG = Goods with logistic requirements, MG = Bulk cargo, RV = Regional transport, BFV = Domestic transport, GFV = International
Fig. 2  Effect of traffic shift from road to rail, 2010
ROAD PRICING
14  IATSS RESEARCH Vol.26 No.1, 2002
network. As soon as there are distance-related charges
introduced this incentive is reduced.
Based on a micro-economic model for road haulage
and reactions observed in other countries (in particular, in
Switzerland after the introduction of HDV charges) an es-
timation of these internal adjustments has been performed.
The aggregate result of the estimations is that the road
hauliers would be able to compensate for about 15% of the
cost increase which is induced by road user charging
through easy-to-implement and legal internal adjustments.
9. EFFECTS ON LOGISTIC PATTERNS
The effects on logistic patterns can be studied by
using an extended warehouse location model developed
by Eberhard9 at IWW. Figure 3 gives an example for a
logistic distribution system with a central port for pro-
cessing imported goods (here, Hamburg and three deliv-
ery warehouses). The model gives a clear tendency for
the change of logistic strategies depending on road user
charging. The number of distribution warehouses tends
to increase while the average distances for goods deliv-
ery will decrease.
Figure 3 presents the transport flows from a distri-
bution network with a single origin import harbor of
goods and three warehouses in Germany. In the left part
of the picture only the transport flows from the ware-
houses to the final customers are shown, while in the right
part the goods supply from the port of Hamburg to the
warehouses is added. The comparison shows that trans-
Fig. 3  Example for a logistic distribution system (Sea port: Hamburg)
port flows resulting from warehouse supply are very sig-
nificant and thus the optimal design of a goods distribu-
tion system must take into account the transport costs to
and from the warehouses. An increase of the number of
warehouses surely decreases the average distance to the
customer, but at the same time increases the average dis-
tance traveled by goods from the import harbor (or pro-
duction site) to the warehouses. It should be clear that
this looks different if the number of ports or production
sites increases.
10. EFFECTS OF THE USER CHARGES ON
THE FLEET STRUCTURE
We assume that over the time range considered be-
tween 2003 and 2010, vehicles of all Euro classes Euro
0 to Euro 5 are available. For newly licensed cars the
Euro 3 standard is obligatory from 2001, Euro 4 from
2004 and Euro 5 from 2008. It has been observed in the
past that three years before introduction of a new stan-
dard already 20% of vehicles correspond to this standard.
Two years before introduction this share is already 60%
and one year before introduction it is 95%. In Germany
the change to environmentally new technology is fostered
through a reduction of the vehicle tax and a reduced vi-
gnette charge for the motorways. A typical result is that
in the year 2010 the share of Euro 0, Euro 1 and Euro 2
is practically negligible. Also the share of Euro 3 is al-
ready drastically diminished while Euro 4 and Euro 5 are
clearly the dominating environmental technologies.
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Assuming a life time of 8–9 years for heavy duty
vehicles, a yearly mileage of 80,000 km and an additional
cost for Euro 4/Euro 5 standard of about 15.000  one can
easily calculate the break-even-point for switching from
old to new technology. According to the calculation, this
is reached if the environmental share of the user charge
exceeds 0.03  per vehicle kilometre. This break-even-
point is easily achieved by many haulage companies and
– assuming that they can sell the used vehicles for the
rest value (eventually to companies in central and east
Europe) they will heavily react to an environmental dif-
ferentiation of the user charge.
11. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF THE
RESULTS
The different results of the computations for the sce-
narios I, IIa and IIb can be compared to the reference sce-
nario on the base of aggregated external cost for accidents,
noise, exhaust emissions and CO2 emissions. This gives
a rough evaluation for the environmental performance,
which can be expected (Figure 4).
Evaluation of Scenario I : Scenario I (user charge
of 0.125  per vehicle km for HDV only on motorways)
does not lead to a change of the environmental position
in freight transport. The main positive effects for this sce-
nario are a slight decrease of motorway use by heavy duty
vehicles and a shift of the vehicle structure towards en-
vironmentally better technology. While the quantitative
impact of structure change of the vehicle fleet is substan-
tial, its impact on the environmental indicators is com-
paratively low. This is mainly caused by the fact that
already in the reference scenario the 2010 vehicle fleet
predominantly consists of Euro 4 and Euro 5 vehicles.
The accelerated shift from Euro 4 to Euro 5, induced by
the user charges, does not lead to a very large environ-
mental impact. Therefore the negative impacts of this
scenario, which stem from the diversion of motorway
traffic to the secondary road network, tends to offset the
positive results completely. Although this diversion from
the motorways to other roads seems to be rather modest
(about 3.5%) it leads to a much higher percent increase
on the links of alternative routes on which the specific
accident and environmental costs of trucking are much
higher than on the motorways. The shift to the railways
is very low and cannot contribute to a better environmen-
tal balance as the railways according to the assumptions
set continue to use old transport technology.
Evaluation of Scenario IIa : In scenario IIa the av-
erage user charge is higher (0.2  per vehicle km) and the
user charge applies to all roads of the Federal road net-
work. As a consequence the overall effects of this sce-
nario is significantly positive for the environment. The
main effect is a substantial rationalisation within the road
haulage industry, improving on their logistics and opera-
tions such that the overall use of roads is reduced. The
traffic diversion to the railways is rather modest as – ac-
cording to the assumptions set – the railway technology
does not change the environmental advantage and traffic
diversion is limited.
Evaluation of Scenario IIb : In scenario IIb it is as-
sumed that the quality of railway service is improved
through investments in the network and better
organisation. As a result not only the “push effects” of
higher prices in road transport are at work, but also the
“pull effects” of better railway services. Altogether this
leads to a reduction of road transport of about 4% for
some market segments as for instance international freight
traffic, this change can be about 10%. The reduction of
traffic load on the motorways is quite significant (about
−8%) and, again, much higher in some market segments
like international transport (−12%) which presently show
the most active dynamics.
Compared to other studies the results of these analy-
ses on impacts of user charges of a modest magnitude are
comparatively low. The main reason is that it can be
shown that there are still many ways for the shippers and
road hauliers to adjust to the user charge and save costs
without basically changing their logistic routines. A fur-
Scenario IIb
Scenario IIa
Scenario I
Secondaries
Motorways
Road, total
Road–Rail
Environmental Evaluation of the Scenarios
Fig. 4 Environmental evaluation of the scenarios (in %
compared with the Reference Scenario; “－”
means reduction and “＋” means increase of
environmental costs)
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ther insight is that one can expect indeed a rapid change
of the environmental technology used as soon as there is
a differentiation of charges according to the environmen-
tal standards. However, as there are already high incen-
tives in the market to change to environmentally more
friendly truck technology a comparison of the environ-
mental impacts for the year 2010 shows that the environ-
mental benefits stemming from a better technology are
significant but not very large. A diversion of a higher
shares of the freight transport markets from road to rail
can only be expected if the logistic quality of railway ser-
vice becomes much better than it is today.
What has not been analysed in this study is the
long-term feedback effects which can be expected if the
push and pull effects persist or are increased over time.
In this case the long-term effects on change of logistic
routines and the change of location after 2010 choices can
lead to different patterns of freight traffic. Bundling ef-
fects can occur such that a share of railway and inland
waterway traffic will be increasing and a change of pro-
duction and warehouse locations can contribute to a re-
duction of distances of road freight traffic. This means
that a rational political strategy could be to start with the
modest scenario I and to change after a medium term to
scenario IIb. After 2010 scenario IIb could be developed
further to generate the long-term feedback mechanisms
which can effect a multiplication of the medium term ef-
fects exhibited in this study.
12. CONCLUSION
It has been shown by combination of micro-eco-
nomic and macro-economic analyses that user charges on
German motorways for heavy duty vehicles, which are
differentiated according to environmental performance,
can bring positive results for the environmental quality.
However, if a pricing scheme is incomplete and includes
only the motorways but not the secondary road network
then also detrimental effects can occur in so far as a traffic
diversion from motorways to the secondary network can
be induced. Even if this diversion comprises only a small
percentage of motorway traffic the negative consequences
on alternative routes in the secondary network can be
quite relevant. In the worst case, the positive effects of
motorway charging can be eaten up completely by such
negative impacts of traffic diversion.
Once the user charging comprises the whole long
distance road network the negative effects diminish. But
small impacts still can be identified because once user
charges reach higher magnitudes they effect a change of
the trade-off between time and distance minimisation. A
clearly positive effect enters the scheme if the railways
are assumed to be able to improve considerably on their
level of service. If shippers and forwarders can allocate
consignments to railway companies without a major loss
of service quality, then a shift of traffic from road to rail
can be achieved which helps to reduce the environmen-
tal load of freight transport.
Summing up the results show that in the medium
term there cannot be expected an environmental bonanza
stemming from a road pricing policy which only applies
to heavy duty vehicles greater than 12t and only to
motorways. An extension of road pricing to light duty
vehicles and cars and the secondary network would mul-
tiply the effect and a continuity of pricing policy over
time and would contribute to create long-term feedback
mechanisms towards a sustainability path for freight
transport.
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